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Prison Disciplinary Procedures: Creating Rules
Jonathan Brant*
t IVEN THAT PRISONS ARE TOTAL INSTITUTIONS, it is hardly surprising
U that the maintenance of discipline within correctional facilities
has always been regarded as extremely important. The purpose of
disciplinary rules has been thought by prison administrators to be a
necessary part of the treatment orientation of the prison which seeks
to regulate inmate behavior within predetermined and sociably ap-
proved modes of behavior.' They are designed not only to assist in
the inmate's rehabilitation, but of course, to insure the security, con-
trol, and orderly administration of the institution.2 Whether dis-
ciplinary procedures actually contributed to rehabilitation was until
the last two years or so beyond the scope of judicial review, the
courts taking the attitude that disciplinary procedures were routine
internal practices which had best remain unexamined "[so] long as
the punishment imposed for an infraction of the rules is not so un-
reasonable as to be characterized as vindictive, cruel, or inhuman,
there is no right of judicial review of it .... Such questions have
consistently been held to be nonjusticiable, for routine security meas-
ures and disciplinary action rest solely within the discretion of the
prison officials and their superiors in the Executive Department." 3
In addition to a lack of interest by the courts, prison officials re-
ceived little direction from state legislatures. The general statutory
provisions grant board powers to a designated member of the execu-
tive branch with no apparent restrictions on exercise of that power.4
The rules developed by prison officials have often been themselves
worded vaguely giving inmates little idea of conduct which is ex-
pected of them.5
Within the past two years, the courts' reluctance to scrutinize
disciplinary proceedings has largely melted away and been replaced
by a willingness to act to provide some measure of due process pro-
tection for inmates in the disciplinary process. No longer is the dis-
ciplinary process regarded as internal and routine. Instead, protection
of the inmate's due process rights has come to be regarded as of
*Of the Massachusetts Bar; Staff Attorney, Boston University School of Law, Center
for Criminal Justice.
Rules of the Indiana State Reformatory, Pendleton, Ind., June 3, 1970.
2 Kraft, Prison Disciplinary Practices and Procedures: Is Due Process Provided?,
47 N.D. L. REV. 9, 22 (1970).
3 Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963) ; cf. Note, Procedural Due Process
in Prison Disciplinary Actions, 2 LOYOLA L. REv. 110 (1971).
4 E.g., Duties of Commissioner, Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 124, §1 (1958). "He . . . shall
. . .make and publish . . .rules and regulations . . . for the government, discipline,
and instruction of the inmates." cf. 18. U.S.C. §4001 (1969).
5 See Mass. Dept. of Correction, Commissioner's Bulletin 71-1, "Policy Governing the
Disciplining of Inmates and Disciplinary Board Procedure" (1971); Tennessee State
Penitentiary, Guidance Manual for Prisoners.
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paramount importance. "The nature of a disciplinary proceeding is
adjudicatory and the interest at stake in such a proceeding, that is,
personal liberty, is of the highest value. Neither institutional rehabili-
tation programs nor the maintenance of discipline and security are
seriously threatened by the assurance of due process; a governmental
desire to conserve funds, while valid, must yield to the protection
of fundamental constitutional rights.6 What the courts have come
to realize is not that disciplinary procedures are inherently suspect
but that standards of fundamental fairness applied to other adminis-
trative proceedings are relevant to the prison disciplinary situation
as well. The U.S. Bureau of Prisons has noted:
No judicial decision precludes appropriate disciplinary
action for misconduct that is imposed in a fair manner. Ad-
verse court decisions have been founded mainly upon what
appears to have been arbitrary and capricious actions result-
ing in unwarranted loss of privileges or the imposition of
unduly harsh physical conditions of confinement. 7
More than anything else, repeated horror stories about arbitrary
disciplinary action by correctional officials against inmates appear
to have been the cause for the courts' abandoning the "hands-off"
doctrine in this area. For many years, inmates have criticized in-
consistency on the part of individual officers which has made it
impossible for them to know the types of conduct which are pro-
scribed.8 Although the U.S. Bureau of Prisons seeks to control inmate
behavior in a "completely impersonal, impartial, and consistent man-
ner,"9 rules and procedures have rarely been so clear that the line
officers, the persons who actually implement the rules, could enforce
them in a knowledgeable, consistent, or fair manner.10 Many com-
mentators have noted this problem, but it is only recently that either
an Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment Due Process chal-
lenge had a reasonable chance of being taken seriously. As the Pres-
ident's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice argued, "[I] t is inconsistent with our whole system of govern-
ment to grant such uncontrolled power to any official, particularly
over the lives of persons. The fact that a person has been convicted
of a crime should not mean that he has forfeited all rights to demand
that he be fairly treated by officials."" Typical of the emerging
scrutiny which prison disciplinary procedures have received from
6 McCray v. State, 10 Crim. L. Rep. 2132 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 11, 1971).
7 U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement 7400.5, Inmate Discipline (July 20, 1970).
8 Note, /Administratie'e Fairness in Corrections, (1969) Wis. L. REv. 587; Note, The
Problems of Modern Penology; Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights, 53 IowA L. REv. 671
(1967).
9 Supra note 7.
10 Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
11 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of justice, Task
Force Report: Corrections 83 (1967); cf. Comment, A Statutory Right to Treatment
For Prisoners: Society's Right of Sell-Defense, 50 NEn. L. REV. 543 (1971).
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the courts is this statement from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit:
Under our constitutional 'system, the payment which
society exacts for transgressions of the law does not include
relegating the transgressor to arbitrary and capricious action.
. . . [W]e cannot, without defaulting in our obligation fail
to emphasize the imperative duty resting upon higher officials
to insure that lower echelon custodial personnel are not per-
mitted to arrogate to themselves the functions of their super-
iors. Where the lack of effective supervisory procedures
exposes men to capricious imposition of added punishment,
due process and Eighth Amendment questions inevitably
arise.12
The effect of the courts' changed attitude has been that discip-
linary hearings have come to be regarded as procedures in which
inmates face the possibility of serious losses through the imposition
of arbitrary punishment. As with procedures on the outside, some of
which involve less serious potential consequences, prison disciplinary
procedures are being scrutinized for their conformance with an
emerging strict notion of due process. 13
The argument for an application of some standard of due process
to prison disciplinary hearings has another basis, corollary to the
above-discussed notion that the potential for arbitrary action must
be curtailed. The latter argument, taking its cue from Goldberg v.
Kelly,14 a case which required adequate hearings before welfare ben-
efits could be cut off, states that whenever a governmental action
may deprive an individual of some substantial benefit, the basic
protections of due process must be provided. The argument analogizes
prison disciplinary hearings to most other administrative proceedings
and requires the same or at least similar protections.15
Although, as will be discussed in greater detail infra, courts have
differed as to the elements of due process required in prison discip-
linary hearings and the rationale for requiring such procedures,
they have rather uniformly dismissed the contentions of prison ad-
ministrators that no safeguards should apply. As one court wrote:
[W] e cannot accept defendants' contention that the essen-
tial elements of fundamental procedural fairness . . . must
be dispensed with entirely because of the need for summary
action or because the administrative problems would be too
burdensome. Although a prisoner does not possess all of the
rights of an ordinary citizen, he is still entitled to procedural
due process commensurate with the practical problems faced
in prison life.'6
12 Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920
(1967).
1 Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, 780 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
14 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
15 See K. DAvis, ADMIIST.ATIVE LAW TExT §7.02 at 115 (1959).
10 Carothers v. Follette, 314 F.Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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As this opinion indicates, courts have engaged in a balancing of
of societal and individual interests in formulating a standard. "The
difficult question, as always, is what process was due"'17 was the
pithy manner in which one court described its task. The process of
balancing can best be seen in relation to particular issues. A dis-
cussion of the major issues follows.
Notice of Rules and Regulations
Although specific disciplinary rules exist in every jurisdiction
they are rarely codified into a rule book which is gven to inmates.
As a result, inmates often have little idea of what activities are pro-
scribed. Further, the possibility for arbitrary action by correctional
officers increases in the absence of clear rules. One commentator has
shown how formulation of a clear rule alleviated difficulties arising
from the vagaries of the previously unwritten disciplinary code.1 8
One court has specifically held that notice of written regulations is
required by due process.1 9 The formulation of such a rulebook, al-
though not yet clearly mandated by the courts, would appear to be
desirable.
Charging and Investigation
When a line officer observes conduct which he regards as a vio-
lation of the rules, he has four choices: he can ignore the misconduct,
let the inmate off with a warning, impose a summary punishment in
the form of a withholding of privileges, or write up a disciplinary
report. 20 Because of the wide discretion which this set of choices
leaves officers, at least one commentator and one court have re-
quired investigation by a superior officer to substantiate the mate-
rial in a line officer's report. 21 The act of bringing a charge would
be taken from the line officer and given to supervisors except in
emergency situations. 22 Such a system is in use in a few states 23 and
many states permit investigation by officers when necessary.24 In
all states where the prison disciplinary rules were examined, there
is an exception permitting summary action when evidence of an im-
minent disorder exists and in many states some summary action is
17 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 196 (2d Cir. 1971); cf. Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d
548, 551 (Ist Cir. 1970), "While all the procedural safeguards provided citizens
charged with a crime obviously cannot and need not be provided to prison inmates
charged with a violation of prison discipline, some assurances of elemental fairness
are essential when substantial individual interests are at stake."
28 Note, Administrative Fairness in Corrections, supra note 8.
19 Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F.Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971); cf. Landman v. Royster,
333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
20 Kraft, supra note 2, at 26.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 70.
23 E.g., Missouri State Penitentiary, Personnel Informational Pamphlet: Rules and Pro-
cedures (1967) ; New Mexico Penitentiary, Memo: Classification Committee and Its
Subcommittees (1971) ; Connecticut Dept. of Corrections, Discipline Procedures (Sept.
1, 1971).




permitted in the case of minor offenses. 25 Generally, some writeup
of the action taken is required after the fact. 6
The rationale for the limitations on line officer discretion in
normal situations is that superior officers generally comprehend
better what the rules are, should be less likely to act arbitrarily,
and should be more concerned with an overall perspective on dis-
cipline, rather than being so intimately involved in the routine of
control of the inmate population.
The arguments for requiring investigation by a superior officer
have considerable merit. With the courts apparently inclined to
demand restrictions on arbitrary action, regulations which fail to
require some review of line officer discretion would appear headed
for conflict with the emergent standard of due process.
Pre-Hearing Detention
The issue of pre-hearing detention raises virtually identical issues
as does the issue of charging responsibility. First, there is the ques-
tion whether the line officer who first observes misconduct can order
the inmate locked up prior to the hearing and whether there should
be a presumption of release prior to hearing. Almost none of the
recent prison disciplinary cases appear to have considered this issue
directly. The most comprehensive discussion was in Morris v. Tra-
visono,27 a case arising from a challenge to the prison rules of the
Rhode Island prison system. The court, following the logic of its
conclusions regarding charging and investigation of misconduct,
determined that only a superior officer could order pre-hearing de-
tention and then only in strict accordance with rules for preventive
segregation. Furthermore, a presumption of release is to exist unless
a superior officer determines that the alleged violation could con-
stitute a threat to institutional order or the safety of particular
inmates. 28
Most prison regulations provide for the detention of an inmate
prior to hearing where the incident has created an immediate threat
to prison order. However, the state regulations tend to permit de-
tention for unlimited periods of time, generally by any correctional
officer.2 9
25 See infra Circumstances When Due Process Standards May Not Apply.
26 Missouri State Penitentiary, jupra note 23.
27 Morris v. Travisono, 310 F.Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1971).
28 Id. at 871.
2 N.H. State Prison, Disciplinary Procedures; Conn. Rules, supra note 23; Arkansas
Dept. of Corrections, Rules and Regulations: Institutional Discipline and Disciplinary
Committees. Mass. Rules, supra note 5, require that an inmate be given written notice
of the reasons for his commitment within 48 hours, but the rules appear to recognize
that a lengthy incarceration may follow since they require the Deputy Commissioner of
Institutional Services to interview the inmate within two weeks of the date of his
commitment. The rules do not set out any rules regarding termination of the com-
mitment.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
21 CILEV. ST. L. H. (2) a
Although the nature of prisons necessitates some right to order
immediate pre-hearing incarceration to punitive segregation, it is
apparent that definite restriction, on the amount of time which can
elapse before written notice of the reasons for the action must be given
and before the formal hearing on the charges is held, must be for-
mulated. The limitations on detention are, of course, directly related
to the standards of adequate notice of the charges.
Notice of the Charges
The issue of notice of the charges has been the one where the
courts have been most insistent in applying a due process standard
to the prison disciplinary hearing. Furthermore, it is not uncommon
for prison regulations to provide for mandatory written notice
already.30 The rationale for requiring notice of the charges is to give
the inmate sufficient information to comprehend exactly what he did
that was wrong and to be able to answer these charges with an ade-
quate defense.3 ' One commentator sees the need for adequate notice
as a means for making comprehensible the vagaries of the system of
prison discipline.
The right to both specific notice of the charges and a
written decision containing the evidence relied upon and the
reasons for the decision takes on added significance when the
exact nature of the conduct in question is either unknown or
vaguely and generally described. In such a case, specific
notice not only informs the accused, perhaps for the first
time, of his alleged conduct, but also serves the accused with
initial notice that such conduct is considered improper.32
There have been a few attempts to determine more precisely
the kind of notice which should be provided. Kraft, in his article,
wants (1) a code of conduct which sets out clear and fair categories
of misbehavior and (2) notice of alleged misbehavior which should
be given orally as soon as the decision to charge has been made and
in written form as soon as practicable. The notice will include a
description of the specific act of misconduct alleged, a complete sum-
mary of the results of the supervisor's investigation, and a listing of
the time and place for the hearing.33 In the Clutchette case, Judge
30 Mass. Rules, supra note 5; Mo. Rules, supra note 23; U.S. Bureau of Prisons Policy
Statement 74-00.6 at 1 (Dec. 1, 1966).
81 Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); The courts have been
unanimous in requiring adequate notice. Among the leading cases besides Clutchette
v. Procunier are: Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F.Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated and
remanded, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F.Supp. 863
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), reefd in part, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Kritsky v. McGinnis,
313 F.Supp. 124-7 (N.D.N.Y. 1971); Bundy v. Cannon, 322 F.Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971);
Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Sinclair v; Henderson, 331
F.Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971); Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Board
of Commissioners, No. 173217 (Mich. Cir. Ct., May 25, 1971); ef. Jones v. Robinson,
440 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
32 Milleman, Prison Disciplinary Hearings and Procedural Due Process-The Require-
ment of a Full Administrative Hearing, 31 Mn. L. Rev. 27, 51 (1971).
33 Kraft, supra note 2, at 71.
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Zirpolis, reasoning from the holding in Goldberg v. Kellya 4 attempted
to formulate a minimum acceptable standard for notice.
: While Goldberg did not establish constitutional minimums,
it seems clear that to satisfy constitutional requirements,
notice of at least seven days of any charge. requiring pro-
cedural due process or disciplinary committee action, is the
minimum acceptable period. Furthermore, to constitute mean-
ingful notice, at least a brief statement of the facts upon
-which the charge is based, as well as the name and number
of the rule allegedly broken must be included.35
The current practices are not as strict as those suggestions, but
several states do specify time restrictions between giving of notice
and the holding of the hearing. In Virginia, for example, the period
is forty-eight hours.3 6 More commonly, the hearing is to be held as
soon'after the alleged infraction as is practicable.3 7
While due process requires that notice of the offense be given,
regulations in this area must set out not only a description of the
act of misconduct alleged, and a summary of the factual situation,
but must also give the inmate information about operations of the
prison disciplinary system and list the time and place of the meeting.
In many respects, the adequacy of notice is directly related to
the adequacy of the rules and regulations since there can be no ade-
quate notice of a vague and incomprehensible rule.3 8
Further, Judge Zirpolis' decision in Clutchette seems correct in
its requirement that adequate notice requires a sufficient interval
between receipt of the notice and holding of the hearing to permit
the inmate to prepare a defense. The seven-day period suggested
there seems a bit long except in exceptional circumstances. A better
rule might require a three or four-day period with automatic con-
tinuance up to eight or ten days at the request of the inmate. Those
inmates who have been placed in pre-hearing punitive segregation
would not be well served by an absolute rule requiring a seven-day
lapse before the hearing. A proposal requiring a longer wait for those
not in detention is not merited because the alleged offenses charged
to the detainees will doubtlessly be more serious.
The Need for a Hearing and Composition of the Hearing Board.
Need for a Hearing.
In some jurisdictions, certain offenses can be adjudicated on the
basis of written reports without the need for holding a formal hearing.
This is the permissible procedure in the federal system, for example,
24 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 264 (1970).
35 Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, 782 (N.D. Cal. 1971). In Landman v.
Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971), the court declined to fix a definite period
but did require that a "reasonable interval" be allowed.
38.Virginia Dept. of Corrections, Inmate Discipline (No. 300, 1971).
37 Rules of Indiana State Reformatory, Pendleton, Ind., June 3, 1970.
88 Note, Administrative Fairness in Corrections, supra note 8.
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which permits the disciplinary board to withhold good time credit-,
able for the month when the violation occurred in this manner.39
In part, the issue of whether a hearing is required is determined by
an analysis of whether a hearing is required is determined by an
analysis of whether procedural due process applies to all violations
of prison disciplinary rules or only to some definable group of more
major violations. That issue will be discussed later. As to the specific
issue whether some form of hearing is required, it would appear
that if due process applies to prison disciplinary procedures, a hearing
must be held. The Court in Landman v. Royster required a hearing for
the following reasons:
Disposition of charges on the basis of written reports is
insufficient. Prisoners are not as a class highly educated men
nor is assistance readily available. If they are forced to
present their evidence in writing, moreover, they will be in
many cases unable to anticipate the evidence adduced against
them.40
Disposition by the Board on the basis of written reports would
be justified only for the most trivial of offenses where the inmate,-
arguably at least, does not face loss of serious privileges.
Need for Impartial Tribunal.
In several of the cases, one or more of the persons sitting on
the hearing committee was either the officer who originally reported
the violation or the investigating officer. The Courts', following lan-
guage in Goldberg v. Kelly or from notions of fundamental due process,
have held that members of the disciplinary board must be impartial
and must not include any previous participants in the case.41
Presently, hearing boards generally consist of several members
of the staff. Often the rules require that representatives of the ad-
ministrative, custodial, and treatment staffs be present.42 One impor-
tant variation in Indiana is the requirement that at least one of
the members of the disciplinary hearing board be from a minority
group.43 Although the term minority group is not defined in the
rules, one can probably assume that the rules recognize the increasing
racial polarization in prison and society at large and seek to insure
the presence of black and Spanish-surnamed representation on the
disciplinary panels. Whether the rule is successful in providing any-
thing more than a symbol in this regard is not known.
39 Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. Civ. RiGnTs-Civ. Lis. L. REv.
227, 231 (1970); see infra Circumstances When Due Process Standards May Not
Apply.
40 Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621, 653 (E.D. Va. 1971).
41 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971) ; Morris v. Travisono, 310 F.Supp. 854 (D.R.I. 1970) ; Bundy v.
Cannon, 328 F.Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971) ; Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767
(N.D. Cal. 1971); cf. Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Mass. Rules,
supra note 5, prohibits involved persons from sitting on the Disciplinary Committee.
42 E.g., Mass. Rules, supra note 5.
42 Indiana Rules, supra note 1.
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Two other suggestions would attempt in part or completely to
remove disciplinary proceedings from the control of prison staff.
One suggestion would require that at least one of the members of
the disciplinary board not be a member of the prison staff.
44 It is
suggested that with the ever-increasing interest in penology among
the general citizenry, well qualified persons can be found who would
gladly serve on a disciplinary board.
A similar suggestion would require that disciplinary hearings be
conducted by one state-employed hearing officer whose sole function
would be to conduct hearings. 45 The theory behind such a proposal
as this and the one above is that correctional officers are part of a
group or system who are likely to regard the word of one of their
number highly. In addition, there. may be problems of "command
influence," particularly in controversial cases. Proposal of some out-
side involvement appears warranted. The second proposal, by re-
moving disciplinary decision making from the correctional staff
entirely, is the more direct attempt to meet the problems inherent
within prisons which may prevent impartiality. Experiment with
hearing officers would appear to be warranted.
Inmates' Rights at a Hearing
Cross-Examination and Right to Call Witnesses.
One of the major points of dispute among the courts has been
the rights which prisoners possess at disciplinary hearings. The split
has occurred on the more controversial and potentially disruptive
issues, particularly cross-examination. The courts have been unani-
mous on the issues of the right of prisoners to defend themselves at
hearings when they would not necessarily have to involve guards
or other prisoners directly. As the Court in Sostre v. McGinnis held:
In most cases it would probably be difficult to find any
inquiry minimally fair and rational unless the prisoner were
confronted with the accusation, informed of the evidence
against him . . . and afforded a reasonable opportunity to
explain his actions. 46
The differences among courts have arisen in such issues as cross-
examination and calling of witnesses. Some courts have feared that
the necessary relationships in a prison would be disrupted if these
rights were allowed prisoners. Judge Wyzanski made the argument
this way.
Cross examination of a superintendent, a guard, or a
fellow prisoner would almost inevitably go beyond the usual
44 Milleman, supra note 32, at 55.
45 The proposal comes from a recent bill proposed in the New York State Legislature,
Assembly Bill 6257 of the 1971-72 regular assembly.
46 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir. 1971) ; accord, Carothers v. Follette,
314 F.Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F.Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1969),
vacated and remanded, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970); Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F.
Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Wright v. McMann, 321 F.Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
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consequences of such probing in court. It would tend to place
the prisoner on a level with the prison official Such equality
is not appropriate in prison. And it is hardly likely that in
the prison atmosphere discipline could be effectively main-
tained after an official has been cross-examined by a prisoner.
There are types of authority, which do not have as their sole
or even principal constituent, rationality. Parents, teachers,
army commanders, and, above all, prison wardens have the
right to depend to a large extent (though not arbitrarily)
upon habit, custom, intuition, common sense, not reduced to
express principles and other forms of judgment based more
on experience than on logic .
A judicial examination of one's fellow prisoners in an
atmosphere of a prison might easily prejudice discipline,
security, and degree, priority, and place. .... 47
The holding in Nolan has been severely criticized by commen-
tators who argue that the restrictions approved there effectively
prevent an inmate from defending himself. "[I]t is anomalous to
suggest that the inmate should be afforded 'an opportunity to be
heard in his own defense,' while at the same time denying him the
corollary right to present witnesses and cross-examine. ' '48 The same
conclusion can be drawn from language in Goldberg v. Kelly which
requires "in almost every setting where important decisions turn on
questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses." 49 One commentator has argued
that the prison disciplinary situation is not one of the exceptions
where Goldberg would not apply.
Considering the significant quantum of personal liberty
which is threatened, the quasi-criminal nature of the disci-
plinary proceeding, the constructive and rehabilitative effect
of a fair disciplinary hearing, and the rather unique pressures
and relationships existing in prisons, it would seem that the
requirement that prison disciplinary proceedings guarantee
inmates the rights to confrontation and cross-examination is
well-founded, though novel.5 0
One Court attempted to balance the concerns of prison adminis-
trators about the maintenance of discipline with the need for ade-
quate procedures at disciplinary hearings. The Court concluded that
cross-examination and calling of witnesses are necessary but that
the witnesses must appear voluntarily and the disciplinary tribunal
can restrict questioning to relevant matters in order to preserve
decorum and limit repetition. 51 On balance, cross-examination does
appear to be a necessary part of prison disciplinary hearings. Al-
47 Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D. Mass. 1969), veated and remanded, 430 F.2d
548 (1st Cir. 1970); ef. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), reversing
in part, Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F.Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
48 Jacob, supra note 39, at 246.
49 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269, (1970), followed in Clutchette v. Procunier, 328
F.Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal, 1971).
50 Milleman, supra note 32, at 51.




though the fears of prison officials and of Judge Wyzanski are not
without merit, the need for ascertainment of the facts at a hearing
would appear to outweigh any possible disruptive effects for main-
tenance of security and discipline. I am in accord with Jacob who
argued for cross-examination because:
The probable effects of granting these safeguards hardly
justify the fear that somehow inmates will suddenly become
the equals of their wardens. Yet, even assuming this to be
true, the negative effects of granting the right would seem
to be a small price to pay for the ascertainment of the truth.
The truth has a poor chance of emerging in any adjudicative
proceeding in which the witness against the alleged offender
is not present, the proof consists of a written hearsay state-
ment of the prosecuting witness, and the defendant is not




The issue of right to representation by counsel is another where
the courts have shown unanimity in their decisions. Following the
lead of several state regulations,5 3 they have rather uniformly re-
jected a requirement that attorney-counsel is required but have
either permitted or required a counsel-substitute. However, the
reasoning for the decisions has varied. The conservative line of cases
represented by the District Court opinion in Nolan v. Scafati and the
opinion of the Second Circuit in Sostre v. McGinnis has emphasized
the need for maintenance of authority in their rejections of the right
to counsel. As Judge Wyzanski wrote:
It is to be borne in mind that neither the superintendent,
nor the committee, nor any guard had a lawyer. Lawyers are
not customarily involved in prison disciplinary matters . . .
Whatever may be the rights of persons who have the full
freedoms of civic life, those who have been placed under the
control of a prison authority are not entitled to the full pan-
oply of a trial, before disciplinary steps are taken. When
society places a man in prison, it has a most important in-
terest in preserving the executive authority of the prison
superintendent. While the warden is not to be an arbitrary
autocrat, he has no need to listen to quibbles and quiddities
before he exercises his commanding authority to secure both
the outside community and the prison community from
danger, reasonably apprehended.54
The cases on the other side approach the issue from the perspec-
tive that prisoners have due process rights which lawyers can pro-
tect. Analogizing from right to counsel cases in the criminal area,
they argue that the rudimentary standard of due process applicable
52 Jacob, suprta note 39, at 247.
53 E.g., Mass. Rules. supra note 5; Mo. Rules supra note 23.
54 Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F.Supp. 1, 3-4 (D. Mass. 1969); ef. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
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to prison disciplinary hearings should contain a right to appear with
counsel.5 5 However, they retract from a firm rule that counsel is
required because of the practical difficulty which could be created
in supplying counsel in all disciplinary hearings. Despite the prac-
tical difficulties, there is some suggestion that retained counsel be
permitted to appear in serious cases with non-lawyer counsel appear-
ing at other times.56 A recent bill introduced in the California legis-
lature57 would permit inmates to have representatives of their own
choosing, including lawyers, represent them at all disciplinary hear-
ings. However, the bill would not require appointment of attorney-
counsel for inmates except in the case of violations of state law.
The potential difficulty with the bill, of course, is an equal protection
argument. Once counsel is permitted for some, the state will have
great difficulty refuting a contention that counsel is requisite for all
especially if prison disciplinary hearings are regarded as "critical
stages" in either the criminal law sense or the Goldberg v. Kelly sense
since serious rights are involved. If one were going to permit counsel
at all, the obligation to provide counsel for indigents arises. With
estimates of 90% indigency among prison inmates, it has not been
surprising that the courts have shied away from rules permitting
counsel. If a system of prison public defenders can be established,
that idea has considerable merit. Otherwise, sticking to counsel sub-
stitute may be a necessary, if unsatisfying, compromise.
Record of the Proceedings.
The need for maintenance of some record of the proceedings is
based upon the proposition that with a record some idea of what
transpired at the hearing can be learned. Several states already
require that some form of record be kept. 58 Generally the record need
not be a complete transcript but is generally a summary of what
transpired. The courts and commentators which have discussed the
issue have been unanimous in urging that summary records of dis-
ciplinary proceedings be maintained. 59 There seems to be no reason
not to follow the practice.
Decision.
The Board Must Give Reasons for Its Decision
To insure that the decisionmaker's conclusions about the guilt
or innocence of an alleged violator of prison disciplinary rules rests
55 Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); ef. Morris v. Travisono,
310 F.Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
58 Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971) ; Jacob, sutra note 39.
57 New York State Legislature Assembly Bill 2904, Isolation and Segregation of Pris-
oners for Disciplinary Purposes (1971); cf. NLADA Proposed Revisions for Lorton
Correctional Complex (1971).
58 E.g., Mass. Rules, supra note 5; Mo. Rules, supra note 23; U.S. Bureau of Prisons,
supra note 30.
59 See Morris v. Travisono, 310 F.Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970); Kraft, supra note 2.
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solely on the proper legal foundation, several states require that
reasons be stated for the decision.60 Generally, the courts have used
due process to require that statements of the reasons for the decision
be given even "though his statement need not amount to a full opin-
ion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law."6' 1 This
requirement should be followed.
The Decision Must Be Based on The Evidence
Similarly, there are requirements in several states that the de-
cision by the disciplinary board be based on the evidence presented.62
The courts have consistently found that it is "fundamental to due
process that the ultimate decision be based upon evidence presented
at the hearing, which the prisoner has the opportunity to refute."63
Several courts have set the standard of proof for finding the prisoner
guilty of the alleged infraction as being substantial evidence rather
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard in criminal
cases.64 The reduced standard is apparently a determination that
disciplinary hearings are better analogized to administrative hearings
than criminal trials. The standard of substantial evidence does not
appear to be sufficient given that to some degree, the liberty of an
individual is at stake. Although the standard of proof need not be
that of a criminal trial, a standard of proof such as "preponderence
of the evidence" which would more clearly place on the prison offi-
cials the burden of overcoming a presumption of innocence for the
inmate6 5 seems better suited for disciplinary hearings.
The Requirement of An Administrative Appeal
In most states, an inmate dissatisfied with the results of the dis-
ciplinary board hearing can appeal to the Warden or Deputy
Warden.6 The Courts have divided on the issue whether due process
requires an administrative review, although those not requiring one
seem inclined to favor regulations which contain provisions for
review: 67 as a further check on arbitrariness, review by the superin-
tendent or warden is justified.
60 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) ; Carothers v. Follette, 314 F.Supp.
1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970) ; Wright v.
McMann, 321 F.Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F.Supp. 1247
(N.D.N.Y. 1970).
61 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 271 (1970). Leading cases in prison area are Morris v.
Travisono, 310 F.Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970) and Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp.
767 (N.D. Cal. 1971) ; but cf. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d (2d Cir. 1971).
62 Virginia Division of Correction, Inmate Discipline (No. 800 revised 1971) ; Mo. Rules,
supra note 23.
63 Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
64 Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F.Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971) ; Morris v. Travisono, 310 F.Supp.
857 (D.R.I. 1970).
"5 See Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Board of Commissioners, No.
173217 (Mich. Cir. Ct., May 25, 1971).
66 E.g., Mass. Rules, supra note 5; Mo. Rules, supra. note 23.
6? Compare Morris v. Travisono, 310 F.Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970) with Landman v.
Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). See Holt v. Sarver, 300 F.Supp. 825, 834
(E.D. Ark. 1969), ajj'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
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Circumstances When Due Process Standards May Not Apply
Emergency Situation
Most regulations presently contain a clause permitting summary
action whenever the Superintendent determines that unusual or
emergency situations exist.68 Inmates can be given the most drastic
temporary punishments including segregation and transfer. Often,
however, the same regulations place a limit on the time when tem-
porary emergency sanctions can be imposed before written notice
must be given to the inmate and a hearing on the issue held.6 9 When
the United States District Court for Rhode Island supervised the
writing of new rules for that state's prisons, it permitted an emer-
gency discipline clause to stand which provided that the sanctions
could be summarily imposed for no more than seventy-two hours,
that the action had to be approved by a superior officer, and that the
inmate had to be informed in writing of the reasons for the action.
The Court did warn that "it would behoove the administration to
construe the Emergency or Temporary Provisions as narrowly as
their language suggests. '70 No other case has scrutinized emergency
provisions as caiefully.
Emergency provisions are always the most difficult to square
with due process because establishing the exception, creates the
possibility of abuse of it. Given that prisons are not free institutions,
it is not difficult to justify acceptance of summary action in emer-
gencies. Nonetheless, the courts will have to be prepared to scrutinize
the activities of prison administrators occurring under the rubric of
an emergency which may not be justified. Regulations permitting
emergency action will have to be drawn up so as to circumscribe the
amount of time an emergency detention can last without approval of
external authorities, and to provide procedures whereby the deter-
mination that an emergency exists can be quickly reviewed by offi-
cials outside of the prison.
Minor Offenses
In many jurisdictions procedural rights are accorded only for
violations of the prison rules which are deemed to be major. Gen-
erally, the distinction between major and minor offenses depends
upon the possible penalty which could be imposed. In Clutchette v.
Procunier, the Court found five instances where due process protec-
tion should apply: (1) where the violations are punishable by in-
definite commitment or segregation; (2) where violations may tend
to increase a prisoner's sentence; (3) where violations may result in
a fine or forfeiture; (4) where violations may result in any type of
isolation confinement longer than ten days; and (5) where violations
68 E.g., Mass. Rules, upra note 5.
9 Id.
7'0 Morris v. Travisono, 310 F.Supp. S57, 861 (D.R.I. 1970).
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may be referred to the district attorney for criminal prosecution.
71
Justification for the distinction between major and minor offenses
is done on the grounds that offenses carrying less serious penalties
are analogous to the category of petty criminal offenses which may
carry fewer Constitutional due process protections.
7 2
The critical issue may not be whether some offenses should be
labeled petty, but whether some minimum standard for due process
should exist. If the purpose of carefully enunciated rules is to reduce
the probability of arbitrary action by prison officials, then perhaps
line officers should not have even the power to order summary losses
such as removal of movie privileges. The best solution is to develop
a carefully drawn code of offenses which will give inmates and cor-
rectional officials alike an understanding of proscribed conduct and
potential penalties for breaking of the rules and hopefully reduce the
potential for arbitrary action. Given the current situation, a distinc-
tion between major and minor offenses is mandated as much by the
systematic pressures caused by the numbers of disciplinary cases as
anything else. If that problem must be accepted, then a division be-
tween minor and major offenses along the lines suggested in the
Clutchette opinion seems warranted. Merely using forfeiture of good
time as the standard fails to consider the severity of other penalties,
even though those penalties may not directly affect the length of
the sentence. One proposed standard would limit the summary power
through informal sanctions to warnings, instruction, counsel and
other "appropriate means of educating individual offenders."7 3 Ap-
parently, all actions which would lead to deprivation of privileges
would require a hearing. If practical, that would seem to be the de-
sirable standard.
71 Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, 781 (N.D. Cal. 1971). These distinctions go
beyond the federal rules when the standard is'forfeiture of good time, Kraft, supra
note 2. Sometimes, as in Indiana, the distinction is based'on the type of offense, Ind.
Rules, supra note 1. Massachusetts makes a distinction only in regard to right of
appeal. Although good time is the standard for the federal system, it is a vague
standard. Good time is revoked in approximately fifty percent of all disciplinary
cases for such disparate offenses as assaulting an officer and being. "out of place",
Kraft, supra note 2, at 74.
73 Note, Federal Court Intervention in State Prison Internal Disciplinary Hearing$ to
Guarantee Fourteenth Amendnent Procedural Due Process, 17 WAYNE .L.. R Y. 931,
945 (1971).
73 NLADA proposed revisions, supa note 57.
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